



DATE: January 20, 1998
TO: Casino Study Committee
RE: The Effect of Casinos on the Detroit and Wayne County
Criminal Justice Agencies

Introduction

With a population of one million people, Detroit is the first city of its size in the United States to host casinos. Because the other cities that have hosted casinos are so much smaller, the experience of these cities is instructional, but it is difficult to apply their experience to Detroit to project how crime and the criminal justice agencies caseloads might increase. In order to attempt such an estimate, this memorandum will:

1. Describe a theoretical model that would predict the impact of casinos on crime;
2. Describe the experiences of other cities with casinos;
3. Explain the difficulties in attempting to apply these experiences to Detroit;
4. Estimate the number of patrons that will visit the casinos if they are to be successful;
5. Explore several methodologies that translate this increased number of visitors into an increase in the occurrences of crime, an increase in the number of arrests, and an increase in the number of events that lead people into the criminal justice system:
 - a) What it means to draw more people into the City of Detroit as a whole;
 - b) What it means to have more police officers on the streets to protect casino patrons;
 - c) What it means to draw more people into the Central Business District of Detroit.

I. A Theoretical Linkage of Crime and Casinos

An increase in crime often is expected with the introduction of casinos to a city. These expectations may be divided into three categories:

- The expectation that people, who otherwise would be law abiding, will turn to crime as a result of problem or pathological gambling. This will be explored later in this memorandum.
- The expectation that problems will occur as a result of more people being attracted to an area.
- The expectation that crime will increase because of the criminal elements introduced to a community with the advent of casinos.

The routine activities theory illustrates how this third expectation applies to casinos. This theory assumes that “[s]ociety provides temptations to commit crime as well as controls to prevent people from following these temptations.”¹ Three factors must be present for criminals to prey on others: “moti-

¹ Felson, Crime and Everyday Life, Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press (1994) p. 22.

vated offenders, suitable targets, and an absence of capable guardians against a violation.”² The lack of any one of these factors is enough to preclude the occurrence of predatory crimes.

Casinos increase the number of “suitable targets,” which can be defined as people, or the possessions of these people, in one place at one time. Furthermore, these “targets” are likely to be carrying money. This should be enough to draw “motivated offenders” to the areas around casinos. The third factor — capable guardians — is the contingent of law enforcement and casino security personnel in place to deter crime. If the number of “guardians” is not sufficiently increased to balance the influx of people (both criminal and non-criminal), the theory predicts that crime will increase.³ This is the only factor over which the government has a direct influence.

Thus, theory accords with common sense: the establishment of a casino in a community may be followed by an upsurge in property and theft offenses. Unless adequate precautions are taken, the casino environment, including hotels, businesses, and parking areas in close proximity to the casino, could provide opportunities for criminals. Casino customers could be subjected to robbery, purse-snatchings, and other thefts, such as hotel burglaries and automobile break-ins.⁴

As will be discussed below, in thinking about casinos and crime, most attention tends to be drawn to the first factor, the number of “suitable targets.” However, it is not clear, based on the experiences of other cities, to what extent the presence of suitable targets is enough to draw the second factor, “motivated offenders.” Additionally, based on the experiences of other cities with casinos, it appears that an effective security contingent goes a long way toward deterring crime.

II. The Experiences of Other Cities

Expectations of large increases in crime upon the introduction of casinos to a city came about as the result of the large percentage increases in crime experienced by cities with small resident populations, and research done after the establishment of casinos in Atlantic City, New Jersey which indicated that casinos brought with them a disproportionate increase in crime.⁵ The implication of this research was that the legalized gambling caused adverse impacts, including crime and other related social costs, not only on the host city, but also on the surrounding areas. This research fit well with the common perception of casinos as perpetuated by the film industry.

A closer examination of other cities’ experiences leads to a contrary conclusion: that legalized gaming does not cause crime. Rather crime in cities with casinos tends to increase proportionately to the increase in the population caused by visitors coming into these cities. The same phenomenon has been experienced in cities that introduce a tourist attraction. “Since the opening of casinos in Atlantic City and the opening of Disney World in Florida, the growth of crime in Orlando far surpasses the growth of crime in Atlantic City.”⁶

Because crime rates are calculated with the resident population as the base, in cities with large visitor populations, it appears that visitor attractions, including casinos, cause an increase in crime. How-

² Cohen and Felson, “Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach,” *American Sociological Review* 44 (1979) p. 589.

³ Giacopassi and Stitt, “Assessing the Impact of Casino Gambling on Crime in Mississippi,” *American Journal of Criminal Justice* 18(1) (1993) P. 122.

⁴ Report to the Governor, New York State Task Force on Casino Gambling (Section IV: Gambling and Crime), August 1996, p. 186.

⁵ Hakim and Buck, “Do Casinos Enhance Crime?” *Journal of Criminal Justice* 17 (1989) p. 409.

⁶ “Casinos and Crime: An Assessment of the Evidence,” Dr. Ted Chiricos, October 1994, p. 2.

ever, if crime rates are calculated based on the overall population, which includes visitors as well as residents, crime rates tend to hold constant or decline.

The routine activities theory suggestion that casinos will draw more motivated offenders and cause and increase in crime has not been experienced in American cities that have introduced casinos. Most of the cities that have introduced casinos have experienced increased crime commensurate with the increase in non-resident population entering the city to visit the casinos. The balance of this memorandum will estimate how the visitor population will grow as people visit the Detroit casinos, and calculate a commensurate increase in crime that can be expected with more people.

III. Difficulties in Applying the Experiences of Other Cities to Detroit

Whether the experiences of other cities are likely to be replicated with the introduction of casinos to Detroit can be questioned for several reasons.

- A. Detroit is a very large city relative to most other U.S. cities that have hosted casinos.
- B. Detroit has a criminal element that exists in the absence of casinos to a larger extent than has been the case in most other cities.
- C. Instead of having a single casino district, Detroit will have land-based casinos located on sites throughout the central business district.

A. The Relative Size of the Cities Being Compared

Certain problems in scale exist any time comparisons are made between a city the size of Detroit and smaller cities that have typically hosted casinos. Detroit is over twice the size of Kansas City, the largest city to date to host casinos. Changes in crime in small cities that would seem very large as a percentage change, would be relatively insignificant in large cities. St. Charles, Missouri, for example, experienced a 20 percent increase in arrests the first year its casino was open, but this represented only 886 more arrests. If Detroit were to experience 886 more arrests between 1996 and 1997, it would represent a one percent increase. On the other hand, if Detroit experiences a 20 percent increase in arrests, it would represent 16,895 more arrests.

Table 1 presents the population of select U.S. cities and Windsor, Ontario, that host casinos in the year that casinos were introduced. Note that the largest city to host casinos prior to Detroit is Kansas City, Missouri, with half the resident population of Detroit.

City	State	Year Casinos were Introduced	Estimated Resident Population in Year of Introduction
Las Vegas	Nevada	1931	8,000
Atlantic City	New Jersey	1977	35,000
Deadwood	South Dakota	1989	1,830
Alton	Illinois	1991	33,228
Joliet	Illinois	1992	77,591
East Peoria	Illinois	1992	21,588
Biloxi	Mississippi	1992	46,319
Aurora	Illinois	1993	99,990
St. Louis	Missouri	1994	399,858
Kansas City	Missouri	1994	438,188
St. Charles	Missouri	1994	54,991
Gary	Indiana	1994	118,031
Windsor	Ontario, Canada	1994	200,000
Detroit	Michigan	1996	1,000,272

Source: U.S. Bureau of Census.

B. A Pre-Existing Criminal Element

An unknown in estimating the impact of casinos in Detroit, is predicting to what extent the pre-existing “criminal element” might redirect its attention to the areas around the casinos with the attraction of more “suitable targets.” Philip Manuel, an authority on crime and legalized gaming, warns that, “casino development or any other tourist attraction in Atlantic City, *Detroit*, New Orleans or Miami Beach for example, will face a pre-existing serious crime problem in those locales.” [emphasis added]⁷ Does placing casinos in a large city reduce the cost of traveling to the casino sites enough to make the opportunity cost of a potential criminal act sufficiently low that people immediately prone to crime, the “motivated offenders,” will be drawn there in search of potential victims? Detroit, like other cities its size, has some history with crime. Will casinos draw the criminals into parts of the city where crime is not currently a problem?

The possible effect of increasing the visitor population in the areas around the Detroit casinos will be considered below. Those considerations will assume that the crime rates will hold constant with an increase in the overall population, thus resulting in an increase in the number of crimes committed. It is interesting to note at this point that only 2.8 percent of Detroit’s crimes were committed within the area constituting the central business district (the 1st Precinct).⁸ With an area as small as the central business district, a small resident population, and such a small percentage of the total crimes committed in the city as a whole, applying the experiences of other casino cities to the central business district is complicated by an unknown — a factor that should concern policymakers — to what

⁷ Manuel, p. 7.

⁸ Detroit Police Department Annual Reports.

extent will individuals currently engaging in street-crime in other parts of the city or metropolitan area refocus their attention to the areas around casinos.

C. The Type and Siting of the Casinos

Most of the smaller casino cities host riverboat casinos rather than land-based casinos. Comparing crime patterns around riverboat casinos to the potential crime patterns around land-based casinos has problems. Riverboat casinos are easier to police for several reasons. First, they are relatively small (in terms of land utilized). Second, for the riverboats that actually cruise, the gambling occurs away from land, during scheduled boat cruises. Finally, there tends to be little if any “criminal subculture” originating around the boat and/or docks, since riverboat sites are usually well controlled and located in previously developed areas of the cities.⁹

Unlike Detroit, the cities that have land-based casinos, Las Vegas and Atlantic City, have kept their casinos grouped in casino districts. In Las Vegas this is along “the Strip;” in Atlantic City it is along “the Boardwalk.” In Detroit, the casinos will be individually located in three sites in the downtown area (See **Map 1** on page 11). Police assigned to protecting the areas around the casinos in other cities have clearly defined areas within which they patrol. This allows the police to “show the badge” and play as large a role in deterring crimes as they do in responding to reports of crime.

Thus, Detroit’s size relative to other casino cities, the pre-existence of a “criminal element,” and having land-based casinos located in separate parts of the downtown area make the impact of casinos a greater unknown than might otherwise be the case. Nevertheless, the experiences of other casino cities will be used to project Detroit’s future.

IV. How Many “Suitable Targets” Will the Detroit Casinos Draw?

The underlying premise in estimating the casinos’ impact on crime is that the casinos will draw enough patrons to be successful. This section will use estimates that have been released by the casino groups to calculate a visitor population, rather than trying to identify the number of potential gamblers in the Detroit market. This process requires a few assumptions along the way (which will be designated with *italic font*). The methodology used in these calculations and the assumptions identified with italics are all based on the Report of the District Attorney’s Commission to Study the Impact of Casino Gambling on the City of New Orleans.

Due to the early nature of the process, it is not yet possible with certainty to identify the exact size and specifications of the three casinos. At the time of this writing, it is known that three groups have been recommended to receive licenses to operate casinos in Detroit. They include the:

- Atwater/Circus Circus Casino Group,
- MGM Grand Group, and
- Greektown/Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians Casino Group.

The specifications these groups have released are as follows (For these purposes, the focus is on the actual casinos with gambling opportunities. The attached hotels, restaurants, shops, and boutiques are external to these calculations):

⁹ “Riverboat Gambling and Crime in Illinois: Preliminary Report on Riverboat Gambling in Joliet: Impact on Criminal Activity and Law Enforcement Workloads,” Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, May 1994.

Table 2
“Final Three” Casino Specifications

	Atwater/Circus Circus Casino Group	MGM Grand Group	Greektown/Sault Ste. Marie Tribe Casino Group
Floor Space	N/A	120,000	128,170
Slot Machines	4,000	2,900	3,800
Table Games	200	115	180

N/A Floor space was not reported for the Atwater/Circus Circus Group.

Source: Detroit Free Press, “Archer trims 4 bidders from Detroit casino list,” August 23, 1997, p. 1A.

The first assumptions expect that every gambling opportunity will be utilized at full capacity. Thus, it is assumed that *full capacity will have one person at every slot machine.*

In order to calculate the number of gambling opportunities at the table games, it is necessary to make assumptions about the number of games available and the number of opportunities at each type of game. It is assumed that *the mix of table games will be roughly 80 percent blackjack, 8 percent roulette, and 12 percent dice games* (See **Table 3**).

Table 3
Mix of Table Games

	Atwater/Circus Circus Casino Group	MGM Grand Group	Greektown/Sault Ste. Marie Tribe Casino Group
Blackjack	160	92	144
Roulette	16	9	14
Dice Games	24	14	22

It is assumed that *8 players can play at each blackjack table, 12 players can play at each roulette table, and 16 players can play at each dice table.* Based on these assumptions, if these casinos are at full capacity at any one moment in time, they will have the following numbers of gamblers (See **Table 4**).

Table 4
Gambling Opportunities

	Atwater/Circus Circus Casino Group	MGM Grand Group	Greektown/Sault Ste. Marie Tribe Casino Group
Slot Machines	4,000	2,900	3,800
Blackjack	1,280	736	1,152
Roulette	192	110	173
Dice Games	<u>384</u>	<u>221</u>	<u>346</u>
Total	5,856	3,967	5,470

It is also assumed that a number of people will enter the casinos who are not gamblers (referred to here as standarounds). These are husbands, wives, family, or friends of gamblers. For purposes of this study, it is assumed that *the number of standarounds will be equal to 15 percent of the gambling opportunities.* Based on all of the above stated assumptions, for these casinos to be at full capacity at any moment, they will have the following numbers of patrons (See **Table 5**).

	Atwater/Circus Circus Casino Group	MGM Grand Group	Greektown/Sault Ste. Marie Tribe Casino Group
Number of Gamblers	5,856	3,967	5,470
Number of Standarounds	<u>878</u>	<u>595</u>	<u>821</u>
Total Capacity	6,734	4,562	6,291

Finally, it is assumed that *the average patron gambles approximately 5.25 hours at a time*. If this assumption is combined with the operating hours of the casinos — 7 days a week, 24 hours a day — it can be concluded that if each casino operates at full capacity for a full day, they will draw the following numbers of patrons (See Table 6).

Atwater/Circus Circus Casino Group	30,786
MGM Grand Group	20,856
Greektown/Sault Ste. Marie Tribe Casino Group	<u>28,759</u>
Total Daily Patronage	80,401
80% Capacity	64,320
60% Capacity	48,240

The three casinos operating all day, every day at full capacity, would draw over 80,000 people each day into downtown Detroit. This estimate represents a mathematical calculation, representing an outside possibility that most likely will not be realized. Such an increase would represent almost a 90 percent increase over the estimated current number of visitors to the central business district (See Table 6). If the casinos are able to reach lesser levels of capacity, a more likely scenario, they will draw upwards of 50,000 people per day into the City, which would represent a 50 percent increase over the estimated number of current visitors.

Preliminary estimates by the casino groups indicate that downtown employment will increase by about 11,100 due to casino hiring. In early proposal details, the Atwater/Circus Circus Casino Group reported that they would staff approximately 3,800 people; the MGM Grand Group proposes to staff 4,000 employees; and the Greektown/Sault Ste. Marie Tribe Casino Group proposes to staff 3,300 employees.

To add another known attraction to the estimates, if the new Lions Stadium is a 52,000 seat facility, with eight regular season and two pre-season games, it will draw an estimated 520,000 people into downtown over the length of a year, or an average of 1,425 people per day. (Tiger Stadium will be moving into the 1st Precinct area, but the current Tiger Stadium already is located in the City.)

For the casino groups, additional visitors to downtown represent patrons, customers, and hopefully profit. For the City of Detroit, Wayne County, and associated governmental bodies, additional visitors represent potential traffic flow problems, potential crowd control problems, greater potential crime victimization, and for the criminal justice agencies, increased caseloads. Thus, the question to be answered is, “How much of a caseload increase are the criminal justice agencies likely to experience with a larger visitor population?”

V. Methodologies for Translating the Number of Casino Patrons into Increased Criminal Justice Caseloads

The experience of other cities has been that the number of crimes tend to increase with the advent of casinos, but only commensurate with increase in the visitor population related to patronage at the casino. Therefore, the general approach taken here is to identify the number of crimes committed in recent years and analyze these relative to the overall population (resident and non-resident populations) in Detroit. Current crime rates are established based on this overall population, and these crime rates are assumed to hold steady with the introduction of casinos and the increase in population. For example, if crimes are currently occurring at a rate of ten per 10,000 people, and an increase is experienced of 50,000 more people into the area, it can be projected that 50 more crimes might occur.

Two of the three methodologies described below (A and C) follow this line of thinking. The third methodology (B) provides an alternative approach: How many more arrests can be expected with an increase in the number of the police officers around the casinos?

A. Detroit as a Whole

On November 6, 1997, CRC presented preliminary findings of projected changes in crime in Detroit using the entire City as the base area. This approach projected that the likely increase in the visitor population due to casinos would be at least offset by the decline in resident population projected by the experts for the year 2000. As a result, there would be no net increase in crime, or caseloads, due to the opening of casinos.

B. The Hiring of Additional Police Officers

In October 1997, the Detroit Law Department released a report calling for the hiring of 283 additional police officers. In addition, the Wayne County Sheriff's Department has stated it's intentions to increase police presence in the areas surrounding the casinos.

It is not readily apparent what impact the hiring of additional police officers will have on the number of arrests. On one hand, having additional officers on the streets around the casinos may lead to deterrence. As the routine activities model discussed above, the three factors needed for criminals to prey on others: "motivated offenders, suitable targets, and an absence of capable guardians against a violation."¹⁰ While successful casinos will clearly increase the number of "suitable targets," and may lead to an increase in the number of motivated offenders, the placing of additional officers on the streets around the casinos may be enough to preclude the "absence of capable guardians against violation." A potential criminal may come to the areas surrounding the casinos with the intention of perpetrating a crime, but the regular presence of police in the area may be enough to discourage these intentions.

On the other hand, an increased police presence may lead to an increase in the number of reported crimes and the number of arrests. This would be so, not necessarily because more crimes are occurring, but because more police are available to uncover crimes that might otherwise have gone undetected or unreported.

¹⁰ Cohen and Felson.

The experience of many cities that have hosted casinos is that the hiring of additional police officers, the security provided by the casinos, and a sort of “safety in numbers” factor have all served primarily as deterrence to prevent crime. Some excerpts from different reports demonstrate these findings:

The Joliet Police Department ... reports that the Harrahs casino located in downtown Joliet has resulted in ‘greatly reduced crime,’ most likely because the casino has brought considerable economic activity and pedestrian traffic to a previously run down and depressed area.¹¹

The East St. Louis “police department reports a reduction in local crime since the introduction of the city’s riverboat casino, attributing it to improved street lighting and tight security provided by the boat. “The riverboat currently has more security personnel than the City police department.”¹²

Davenport, Iowa “police officials report ‘no increase in crime and no negatives,’ the Riverboat Development Authority reports that the two new police officers hired after casinos were legalized were ‘not needed as crime has decreased’”¹³

Across the Detroit River, Windsor added 25 officers to the police force just prior to the opening of its temporary casino (paid for by the casino). In an attempt to track crime patterns with the casino, Windsor was divided into three regions: the “primary” region encompasses about 3 square miles of area immediately surrounding the casino; the “secondary” region encompasses a 1.5 square mile ribbon of area around the primary region; and the “turf” region encompasses the rest of the city. The experience of the Windsor police was that the number of reported crimes decreased in the primary region following the opening of their casino.

A factor that separates Detroit from the experience of other casinos cities in increasing police presence on account of casinos, is how the casinos will be located in Detroit. As was discussed earlier, the three casinos in Detroit will be located individually in different areas of the central business district. Other cities have either created casino districts, with all casinos located in a common area, or have riverboat casinos. This allows the police to concentrate their efforts around the casinos and provide a zone within which patrons might feel safe to travel from their automobile to the casinos and from the casinos to other casinos or restaurants and stores. Because the Detroit casinos will be spread out, it will be more difficult to provide that safe zone. As a result, it may be more likely that the additional officers play a lesser role in deterring crime and play larger role in identifying and responding to reported crime.

C. Detroit Central Business District

The final approach is to look at the number of crimes committed in the area encompassed by the central business district (which is basically corresponds with the Detroit Police Department’s 1st Precinct) — where the casinos ultimately will be located — relative to the overall population (the resident and visitor populations) in this area (See **Map 1**).


This approach has a couple of complications. First, arrests are reported only on a city-wide level, not at the precinct level. As a result, the calculations made below are based on crimes committed in the 1st Precinct and these results are translated into arrests. Second, estimating non-resident populations

¹¹ The WEFA Group, “Current Information on the Link Between Casinos and Street Crime,” (March 1994), p. 6.

¹² The WEFA Group, p. 7.

¹³ The WEFA Group, p. 7.

in subsections of a city is more difficult than estimating this population for the city as a whole (although estimating this population for the area encompassed by the 1st Precinct is less difficult than doing so for any other part of the city).



1. Estimating the Overall Population

Resident Population. The Southeast Michigan Council of Governments (SEMCOG) estimates the 1995 resident population for the area encompassed by the Central Business District was 5,350. If this were used as the base population for calculating the crime rate, it would mean that over 60 percent of the residents had a crime committed against them in an average year from 1992 to 1996. This of course did not happen. Commuters and other non-residents represented a number of these crime victims.

	Yearly Attendance	Average Daily Attendance	Total
1990 Population			5,526
Estimated Number of Visitors			
Downtown Employment		74,186	
Joe Louis Arena	2,641,000	7,236	
Overnight Visitors	160,000	438	
Cobo Hall	2,200,000	6,027	
Cobo Arena	360,000	984	
Music Hall	300,000	822	
Michigan Opera Theater	460,000	1,260	
Fox Theater	900,000	2,466	
Second City Comedy Club	91,000	249	
Greektown	300,000	822	
Business Visitors	1,000,000	<u>2,740</u>	
Estimated Total Visitors			<u>97,229</u>
Total Daily Population			<u>102,579</u>

Sources: Population and Employment from SEMCOG; overnight hotel stays from Metropolitan Detroit Convention & Visitors Bureau; others from interviews with coordinating bodies.

Non-Resident Population. Identifying the non-resident population of the area encompassed by the Central Business District is the most difficult part of this approach. Some events and facilities that cause people to visit this area are known, such as events at: Joe Louis Arena, the Fox Theater, Music Hall, the Michigan Opera Theater, and Cobo Hall. The numbers of visitors to other destinations, such as Greektown and the government and office buildings, are harder to identify.

A conservative estimate of the current visitor population to the area encompassed by the Central Business District on an average day is about 97,229 people (See **Table 7**).

Overall Population Base. Combining the resident population of 5,526 with the estimate of 97,229 visitors to this area, the overall population base is estimated to be 102,579 people on an average day (See **Table 7**).

2. Crimes Committed in the 1st Precinct

Table 8 summarizes the index crimes reported in the 1st Precinct during the years 1992 through 1996. Violent offenses include homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Property offenses include burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.

Table 8
Reported Crimes in the Detroit Police Department's 1st Precinct: 1992-96

Offense Type	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	5 Year Average
Homicide	3	3	3	6	2	3
Rape	12	9	21	18	18	16
Robbery	228	231	212	205	168	209
Aggravated Assault	132	151	128	138	155	141
Burglary	157	200	186	176	169	178
Larceny	1,638	1,966	2,484	2,211	1,955	2,051
Motor Vehicle Theft	<u>821</u>	<u>733</u>	<u>833</u>	<u>761</u>	<u>751</u>	<u>780</u>
Total Part I Index Offenses	2,991	3,293	3,867	3,515	3,218	3,377
Violent Offenses	375	394	364	367	343	369
Property Offenses	2,616	2,899	3,503	3,148	2,875	3,008

Source: Detroit Police Department Annual Reports.

3. Crimes Per 10,000 People

The reported crimes for the years 1992 through 1996 are averaged to control for anomalies in any one year that might bias the numbers. An average of 3,377 index crimes were reported in the 1st Precinct each year during the period from 1992 through 1996. Crimes reported in the 1st Precinct constitutes a minor proportion (2.8 percent) of the crimes reported throughout the entire city. Roughly 3.5 percent of the persons living in or visiting the 1st Precinct are victims of crime. (See Table 9.) The majority of the offenses reported in Detroit, 89.1 percent in the 1st Precinct and 78.5 percent citywide, were property offenses.

Table 9
Average Number of Offenses in 1st Precinct: 1992-96

Offense Type	5 Year Avg. of Crimes Reported	Crimes per 100 Persons	Percent of Total Detroit Crimes
Homicide	3	0.0	0.7%
Rape	16	0.0	1.4%
Robbery	209	0.2	1.8%
Aggravated Assault	141	0.1	1.1%
Burglary	178	0.2	0.8%
Larceny	2,051	2.1	4.8%
Motor Vehicle Theft	<u>780</u>	<u>0.8</u>	2.6%
Total Part I Index Offenses	3,377	3.5	2.8%
Violent Offenses	369	0.4	1.4%
Property Offenses	3,008	3.1	3.2%

Source: Crime statistics from Detroit Police Department Annual Reports; population from numbers used in Table 7; CRC calculations.

4. Projected Increase in Crime

For the purposes of estimating how crime will change with casinos, it is assumed that the ratio of crimes to every 100 persons in the 1st Precinct will remain stable for each category of property crimes. The experience of other cities indicates most increase in crime is property crime. Therefore, the ratio for violent crimes uses every 200 persons, effectively cutting in half the estimated population increase.

80 Percent of Capacity. If the three casinos are able to fill their floor space to 80 percent capacity, there will be 64,321 more people, an increase of approximately 70 percent over the estimated current population, in the area encompassed by the 1st Precinct. With this increase in non-resident population, it is estimated that 2,392 more crimes will be committed in this area. This would represent a 79 percent increase in the number of index crimes reported in the 1st Precinct, increasing the number of crimes to 5,768 offenses, or about 4.8 percent of all crimes reported in the city. (See Table 10.)

**Table 10
Projected Crimes If Casinos Draw to 80 Percent Capacity**

Offense Type	Additional Crimes*	Offenses in 1st Precinct w/ Casinos	Percent of Total Detroit Crimes**
Homicide	1	5	0.9%
Rape	6	21	1.9%
Robbery	78	287	2.5%
Aggravated Assault	53	194	1.5%
Burglary	133	311	1.4%
Larceny	1,536	3,587	8.5%
Motor Vehicle Theft	584	1,364	4.6%
Total Part I Index Offenses	2,392	5,768	4.8%
Violent Offenses	138	507	2.0%
Property Offenses	2,254	5,262	5.6%

* To account for experience in other cities that most increase in crime related to casinos is property crime, increased population due to casinos has been halved for violent crimes.

** Percent of Total Detroit Crimes assumes no change in crime patterns in other parts of the city.

Source: CRC calculation from Tables.

60 Percent of Capacity. If the three casinos are able to fill their floor space to 60 percent capacity, there will be 48,240 more people, an increase of approximately 50 percent over the estimated current population, in the area encompassed by the 1st Precinct. With this increase in overall population, it is estimated that 1,891 more crimes will be committed in this area. This would represent a 63 percent increase in the number of index crimes committed in the 1st Precinct, increasing the number of crimes reported to 5,268 offenses, or about 4.4 percent of all crimes reported in the city (See **Table 11**). As a point of reference, when the number of index crimes increased from 2,991 in 1992 to 3,867 in 1994, it represented a 29 percent increase.

Table 11
Projected Crimes If Casinos Draw to 60 Percent Capacity

Offense Type	Additional Crimes*	Offenses in 1st Precinct w/ Casinos	Percent of Total Detroit Crimes**
Homicide	1	4	0.9%
Rape	5	20	1.8%
Robbery	62	271	2.3%
Aggravated Assault	42	183	1.4%
Burglary	105	283	1.3%
Larceny	1,215	3,266	7.7%
Motor Vehicle Theft	462	1,242	4.2%
Total Part I Index Offenses	1,891	5,268	4.4%
Violent Offenses	109	478	1.8%
Property Offenses	1,782	4,790	5.1%

* To account for experience in other cities that most increase in crime related to casinos is property crime, increased population due to casinos has been halved for violent crimes.

** Percent of Total Detroit Crimes assumes no change in crime patterns in other parts of the city.

Source: CRC calculation from Tables.

5. Projected Increase in Arrests

Past Arrests. Table 14 shows the number of arrests for the years 1992 through 1996. This data is divided into Arrests for Index Crimes, which correspond to the projected crime increases described above, and Non-Index Crimes. Detroit averaged 18,778 arrests for index crimes in the period from 1992 through 1996, and 61,309 arrests for non-index crimes. In total, Detroit averaged a total of 78,521 arrests during this period.

Offense Type	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	5 Year Average
Homicide	1,617	1,502	1,381	1,215	1,026	1,348
Rape	1,110	874	896	815	859	911
Robbery	3,007	2,959	2,942	2,203	2,141	2,650
Aggravated Assault	5,043	5,047	5,506	N/R	6,039	5,409
Burglary	2,824	2,618	2,695	2,772	2,691	2,720
Larceny	4,617	3,356	3,262	3,093	2,860	3,438
Motor Vehicle Theft	702	514	565	448	450	536
Arson	220	216	247	N/R	291	244
Total Index	19,140	17,086	17,494	23,811	16,357	18,778
Negligent Manslaughter	30	17	19	N/R	32	25
Assault	4,389	4,786	6,007	N/R	7,600	5,696
Forgery/Counterfeiting	412	576	571	477	454	498
Fraud	594	950	2,792	N/R	715	1,263
Embezzlement	35	56	33	N/R	80	51
Stolen Property	5,737	4,881	5,322	5,317	5,792	5,410
Vandalism	1,292	1,163	634	N/R	1,318	1,102
Weapons Possession	4,177	4,353	2,833	3,349	3,092	3,561
Prostitution & Vice	1,611	1,182	1,199	2,320	1,970	1,656
Sex Offenses	448	429	534	601	560	514
Narcotic Laws	7,215	7,318	8,072	9,144	9,092	8,168
Gambling	84	60	765	108	82	220
Family & Children	519	657	743	877	984	756
Driving Under Influence	1,964	1,715	906	N/R	1,870	1,614
Liquor Laws	169	133	200	158	137	159
Disorderly Conduct	6,904	5,915	7,059	8,482	7,348	7,142
All others	<u>22,913</u>	<u>21,869</u>	<u>24,562</u>	<u>30,833</u>	<u>26,949</u>	<u>25,425</u>
Non-Index Total	58,493	56,060	62,251	61,666	68,075	61,309
Curfew	130	141	N/R	N/R	44	105
Runaways	34	4	N/R	N/R	0	13
Grand Total	77,797	73,291	79,745	85,477	84,476	78,521

N/R -- Not Reported

Source: Detroit Police Department Annual Reports.

Relating Crimes to Arrests. Comparing the number of crimes reported in **Table 8** to the number of arrests reported in **Table 12**, it can be stated that on average one arrest occurs in the city for every nine index crimes reported. This breaks down to one arrest for every 2.5 violent crimes reported, and one arrest for every 15.5 property crimes reported (See **Table 13**).

Table 13
Comparison of Index Crimes Reported to Arrests in Detroit:
Based on Average of Years 1992 through 1996

	1st Precinct Average Crimes	City-Wide Average Crimes	City-Wide Average Arrests	Ratio of Crimes to Arrests
Homicide	3	517	1,348	0.4:1
Rape	16	1,151	911	1.3:1
Robbery	209	11,613	2,650	4.4:1
Aggravated Assault	141	12,598	5,409	2.3:1
Burglary	178	22,231	2,720	8.2:1
Larceny	2,051	42,293	3,438	12.3:1
Motor Vehicle Theft	780	29,702	536	55.4:1
Total Index	3,377	120,105	17,012	7.1:1
Violent Offenses	369	25,880	10,318	2.5:1
Property Offenses	6,385	214,331	13,835	15.5:1

Source: Detroit Police Department Annual Reports, CRC calculation.

These are very crude comparisons — since we do not know when the crimes were committed that ultimately led to the arrests (a crime in December might have led to an arrest in January) or if one person arrested is responsible for committing more than one of the reported crimes. Despite these weaknesses, this same relationship can be carried forward to extrapolate an estimate of the number of arrests likely to occur with the increase in crimes corresponding with the advent of casinos, and thus the increased caseload likely to occur.

New Arrests for Index Crimes. Such a methodology indicates that casinos could lead to 200 more arrests if the casinos are able to operate at 80 percent capacity and 158 more arrests if the casinos are able to operate at 60 percent capacity. Even though most of the projected increase in crime is for property crimes,

Table 14
Estimated Increases in Index Crimes
Based on Past Relationships of Reported Crime to Arrests

	80%		60%	
	New Crimes	New Arrests	New Crimes	New Arrests
Homicide	1	3	1	3
Rape	6	5	5	4
Robbery	78	18	62	14
Aggravated Assault	53	23	42	18
Burglary	133	16	105	13
Larceny	1,536	125	1,215	99
Motor Vehicle Theft	584	11	462	8
Total Index	2,392	200	1,891	158
Violent Offenses	138	48	109	38
Property Offenses	2,254	152	1,782	120

Source: Detroit Police Department Annual Reports, CRC calculation.

because violent crimes have a higher rate of crimes per arrest than property crimes, the distribution of projected increases in arrests that is about equal for violent and property crimes. (See **Table 14.**)

It should be noted, that while operating at 80 percent of capacity at all times may be difficult to achieve, an increase of 200 arrests represents only a 1.1 percent increase over the average number of arrests for index crimes in Detroit for the years 1992 through 1996.

New Arrests for Non-Index Crimes. Reports dealing with the experiences of other casino cities do not spend as much time dealing with non-index crimes. Anecdotal evidence from these reports indicates that Detroit should expect an increase in the number of such crimes as: embezzlement; passing bad checks; money laundering; prostitution and vice; petty theft; disorderly conduct; intoxicated persons; and drivings under the influence. Windsor police report particularly large increases in forgery and counterfeiting crimes and fraud crimes.

Because there is little data with which to estimate increases in the number of arrests for these crimes, a range of percentage increases is provided for those crimes most likely to be affected by casinos (See **Table 15**).

Estimating an increase in non-index crimes is again complicated by the Detroit Police Department practice of not reporting arrests by precinct. It is assumed for these purposes that arrests for non-index crimes have the same distribution throughout the precincts as the distribution of index crimes. This assumption results in 2.8 percent of all non-index crimes occurring in the 1st Precinct.

	45% Increase	60% Increase	75% Increase
Forgery/Counterfeiting	6	8	11
Fraud	16	21	27
Embezzlement	1	1	1
Stolen Property	68	91	114
Prostitution & Vice	21	28	35
Family & Children	10	13	16
Driving Under Influence	20	27	34
Disorderly Conduct	90	120	151
Total	233	310	388

Source: Detroit Police Department Annual Reports, CRC calculation.

Increases in non-index crimes in the magnitude of 45 percent would result in 233 more arrests; a 60 percent increase in arrests for these crimes would result in 310 more arrests; and a 75 percent increase would result in 388 more arrests. An increase of 233 arrests for non-index crimes would represent a 0.4 percent increase over the average number of arrests for these crimes from 1992 through 1996 throughout the entire city; an increase of 388 arrests would represent a 0.6 percent increase over the average for the entire city (See **Table 12**).

6. Other Increases in Caseload

In addition to the index crimes for which statistics are readily kept, it can be expected that the criminal justice system will experience increased caseloads from other factors. These factors might include

crimes unique to legalized gambling committed within the casinos, increases in traffic and parking violations, and increases in bankruptcies.

Casino Crimes. There will be new crimes for which criminal justice officials will have to prosecute. These could include casino patrons attempting to cheat to win the games, attempting to launder counterfeit money, and stealing from other casino patrons. Additionally, they will have to prosecute cases of casino employees cheating to help someone win, skimming some of the winnings, or violating laws pertaining to casinos in other ways.

Motor Vehicle Violations. If it is assumed that people travel to the casinos at an average of two people per car, parking accommodations in downtown Detroit will be needed for anywhere from 24,000 to 40,000 more vehicles when the casinos open. In addition, 11,100 casino employees will need parking arrangements. If these employees travel alone, as so many people do when they work in downtown Detroit, each employee could require separate accommodations.

Traffic Violations. It can be expected that the number of traffic violations will increase with a greater number of vehicles transporting people into the central business district. Without knowing for certain where the casinos will be located, or how traffic patterns will be changed to accommodate the casinos, it is impossible to estimate an increase in traffic violations.

Parking Violations. The temporary casino in Windsor opened under some of the same circumstances that the Detroit casinos might expect when they open. Among the experiences that Windsor faced was an escalation in the number of parking violations as parking became a scarce commodity in the downtown area, and especially in the area immediately surrounding the casino. As parking became a valued commodity, the parking ramps and lots around the casinos hiked their prices to capitalize on the increased demand. Those not willing to pay the steep price to park in a guarded ramp or lot, but still wanting to park close, began parking on the streets. Windsor had to increase staff on the Parking Enforcement Unit to cope with this problem. More tickets were issued, and there was an increased caseload in the criminal justice system. An additional administrative burden was created in issuing parking permits to those residents in the areas around the casinos who need to be able to park in the streets without being ticketed.

While the patrons' visits to the casinos will be spread out over a 24 hour period and the casino employees will be working in shifts, the increased demand for parking is still very real. The supply of downtown parking already has the potential to fall far short of demand on days of major events, such as the auto show, the boat show, the Society of Automotive Engineers' convention, and the fireworks display. Adequate parking for the casinos should be given much attention to make access to the casinos as easy as possible. If this is done, it is unlikely that the city will experience a large increase in parking violations. As with traffic violations, it is impossible to calculate an increase in these violations without knowing more details on how things will change with casinos.

7. Summary

This methodology attempted to estimate the impact of casinos on the area immediately surrounding the future sites — the central business district or the Detroit Police Department's 1st Precinct. The driving concern using this methodology is the number of new visitors to the area. Based on what has been disclosed about the casinos and making a few assumptions about what is not known, it is estimated that the three casinos would draw between 48,000 and 64,000 people each day into the central business district, representing an increase of 50 percent in the current number of visitors to this area.

A couple of basic assumptions of this methodology were:

1. That people that currently engage in crime in other parts of the city would not redirect their attention to the areas around the casinos due to the larger number of potential targets; and
2. That the chances of making an arrest for a committed crime are equal throughout the city.

Based on this methodology and assumptions, it is estimated that the Detroit will experience increases ranging from 160 to 200 additional index crimes and 233 to 388 additional non-index crimes.

D. Crimes of Problem or Pathological Gamblers.

A major difference between the Detroit casinos and the casinos already operating in the other U.S. cities, is their proximity to the potential customer base. When casinos first opened in Las Vegas in 1931, the city was an oasis in the desert. Throughout the years, people visited Las Vegas, stayed for several days, and then returned home. Casinos that have recently opened in small cities, such as Biloxi, Mississippi, Joliet, Illinois, and Cripple Creek, Colorado, share a common characteristic that while they are within a days travel of their customer base, a small percentage of the customer base is located in the areas immediate surrounding these cities. The externalities of casinos benefit cities such as Las Vegas and the smaller cities that have recently begun hosting casinos in the form of increased dollars pumped into the local economies and increased employment for city residents, while exporting the social ills associated with problem and pathological gamblers to other areas.

Larger cities, such as St. Louis, Kansas City, New Orleans, and now Detroit, with a larger percentage of the potential customer base in the immediate surrounding areas, experience the social ills as well as the economic benefits. The problems other large cities have experienced in identifying the crimes of pathological gamblers, is that these crimes occur in the absence of legalized gambling. Additionally, in the presence of legalized gambling, they usually occur in a location removed from the casino site. Thus, while some categories of crime can be identified from interaction with admitted pathological gamblers, no numbers exist from other cities that can be used to estimate the effects that casinos will have in Detroit.

Livingston found compulsive gamblers involved in check forgery, embezzlement, theft, larceny, armed robbery, bookmaking, hustling, running con games, and fencing stolen goods. There were also cases of systematic loan fraud, burglary, pimping, prostitution, selling drugs, hustling at pool, golf, bowling, cards, and dice.¹⁴

Often, pathological gamblers are driven to commit illegal acts that they otherwise would not be compelled to commit. People are driven to these acts out of desperation for money or from the stress caused by gambling losses. Approximately 66 percent of non-incarcerated and 97 percent of incarcerated pathological gamblers admit to engaging in illegal behavior to finance gambling or to pay gambling-related debts. Most of the crimes committed are non-violent, property crimes in the form of white collar crime or street crime, very rarely are these people driven to violent crimes.¹⁵

In 1974, when Las Vegas presented the only opportunity for legalized gambling, fewer than one percent of the U.S. adult population was recognized as having a compulsive gambling problem. At the

¹⁴ The American Psychiatric Association defines pathologic or compulsive gambling as “chronic and progressive failure to resist impulses to gamble, and gambling behavior that compromises, disrupts, or damages personal, family, or vocational pursuits.” From “Compulsive Gambling,” Lesieur, *Society* (May/June 1992).

¹⁵ Rosenthal and Lesieur, “Pathological Gambling and Criminal Behavior,” *Explorations in Criminal Psychopathy: Criminal Syndromes with Forensic Implications*, Edited by Louis B. Schlesinger, as cited in the New York Task Force on Casino Gambling.

same time, compulsive gamblers in Nevada were estimated as 2.5 percent of the state population.¹⁶ If it can be assumed that 2.5 percent of the Wayne County population (2,064,908 in 1994) is compulsive gamblers, roughly 51,600 people in Wayne County may be prone to the problems of compulsive gambling. Likewise, as many as 36,000 people may be prone to the problems of compulsive gambling in Oakland County (with a 1994 population of 1,441,997), and as many as 18,200 people in Macomb County (with a 1994 population of 728,563) may be prone to compulsive gambling. Lesieur writings included a note of significance to Detroit, due to its demographics. According to Lesieur, “epidemiological surveys indicate that the problem [of pathological] gambling is greater among the poor and minorities than other segments of the population.”¹⁷

Proposal E included language dedicating revenues to the establishment of compulsive gambler programs to help people prone to these problems. Because such crimes may occur at both time and place removed from the visit to the casino, and often by individuals prone to social ills in other forms, there is very little documentation showing the rate of crime that can be expected from exposing more people as compulsive gamblers. If these people change their behavior in incremental degrees, and commit a number of acts before they admit they have a gambling problem, it is probable that some crimes will be committed no matter how effective any programs designed to deal with compulsive gamblers.

One element that must be considered when attempting to project the increase in these crimes as a result of exposing more people as compulsive gamblers, is that these are not the first casinos in this area. For most of metropolitan Detroit, access to a casino is immediately available in Windsor, with roughly the same drive time as traveling to downtown Detroit. For those individuals most prone to the ills of pathological gambling, the opportunity has presented itself since 1984 with Indian gaming and since 1994 with the opening of the temporary Windsor casino. However, it is also the case that “where more forms of gambling are legal, the incidence of problem and pathological gambling is also higher.”¹⁸

Bankruptcies. Lesieur writes that the mean gambling-related debt of individuals in treatment for pathological gambling ranges from \$53,000 to \$92,000 (not including auto loans, mortgages, and other “legitimate” debts).¹⁹

Windsor reports an increase in the number of, and increased activity at, pawn shops since the opening of the casinos. One responsibility of the police and courts in Windsor is to investigate all property being brought into pawn shops to ensure that it is not stolen. Since crime is down in Windsor (property crimes are down 17 percent) and most of the investigations of property brought into the pawn shops has shown no indications of crime, it can only be assumed that the increased activity in pawn shops is a result a higher volume of people just needing money because they have over-extended themselves at the casino.

Domestic Violence/Child Neglect. Lesieur also documents a study indicating that 62 percent of a sampling of individuals in a family support group had engaged in physical violence by the spouse against the gambler.²⁰ In addition, Windsor reports a number of cases of children being left alone in hotel rooms near the casino while the parents patronize the casino.

¹⁶ Gallop poll result reported in Lesieur.

¹⁷ Lesieur.

¹⁸ Lesieur.

¹⁹ Lesieur.

²⁰ Lesieur.

E. Additional Factors That Could Increase Costs for Criminal Justice Agencies

The Impact of Casino Gambling on the City of New Orleans points to a number of other costs (often front-end costs) to the criminal justice system that will be associated with the advent of casinos. These are all factors for which the ability to project budget demands is hindered by an inability to look into the future.

Staffing Needs. With the increased burden that crime rates may occur with casinos, will come increased staffing needs. This will be true both in requiring more employees and in requiring more things from the current employees.

In addition to any need for more employees, money will have to be budgeted to train current employees to deal with new laws that pertain solely to legalized gambling. Many of the current employees will need to learn from the cities that have experience with casinos. Their education will need to cover the nature of casino gambling, as well as learning the state and local laws and regulations that pertain directly to the operation of casinos.

In addition to the recruitment and training of new employees, the replacement of current employees may prove costly as well. Past experience has shown that when casinos enter a new city, they often turn to the criminal justice agencies to staff their security offices. Law enforcement personnel, such as police officers, may be drawn to more lucrative, higher paying, positions in the private casino security offices.

This phenomenon would exacerbate the recruitment and training problems that these agencies will face under the best of circumstances. Attrition will require further hiring just to remain at current staffing levels. In addition, the institutional knowledge or years of experience that the departing employees could represent will add to the cost of training new and lower ranking employees. Finally, the market forces that will draw some employees to the private casino security offices may force the City and County to increase wages in order to retain employees.

Linkages with Different Levels of Government and With Casino Security. The need for the city and county to have solid relations with each other and with the state and federal governments increases with some of the categories of crime associated with casinos.

Additionally, the city and county criminal justice agencies will be drawn into a greater level of interaction with private security companies. The most significant of these relationships will ultimately be the casino security offices for the apprehension and prosecution of crimes that occur on the casino floor. The importance of maintaining strong relationships with private security entities will extend to hotel security, both attached to the casinos and in other parts of the city, private companies that patrol attached parking ramps, and with credit card corporations.

Witness Program. Tourist attractions, especially casinos, require the development and implementation of an extensive witness protection program. Such a program would facilitate the financing and coordination of the return of witnesses to the city or county of the alleged crime. Finances involved in such a program include long-distance telephone costs, room and board costs for the periods in which the witnesses are in the city, and transportation costs for the witnesses. The coordination costs would include the costs in arranging for the return of witnesses from other parts of the nation, and the cost of a liaison to make the witnesses feel comfortable in returning to the city to act as witnesses in a criminal case. While witness programs already are in place for the city and county, the importance of these programs increases with the nature of casinos and the potential of drawing visitors to Detroit from different parts of the nation.

VI. Conclusion

It is clear that casinos will bring more people into the central business district of Detroit when they begin operations. It is also evident from the experience of other cities that have had a new influx of visitors, whether related to casinos or otherwise, that the number of crimes tends to increase proportional to the number of new visitors. Based on this knowledge, we have attempted to estimate how crime in Detroit will be affected by the opening of the casinos.

Based on a potential growth of half again as many visitors into the central business district as is currently present on a typical day, and an assumed continuation of the current crime rate relative to the overall population, it is estimated that reported index crimes will increase by as many as 1,782 crimes per year. The experience of other casino cities is that an increased overall population causes an increase in property crimes, but very little increase in violent crimes. Therefore, the estimates of an increased overall population are weighted fully in estimating an increase in property crimes, but weighted only half in estimating an increase in violent crimes.

Because there is nothing to indicate that the Detroit Police Department will get more efficient in arresting the perpetrators of these crimes, the ratio of crimes to arrests is assumed to remain constant after casinos. Based on these ratios, it is estimated that the courts will face at least 158 additional persons arrested for index crimes if the casinos are able to operate at 60 percent of capacity. If they are able to operate at 80 percent of capacity, the city can expect about 200 additional persons arrested. Increases in index crimes fall on the court system as felony cases, all of which would be introduced to the court system through the 36th District Court, but the case itself would be tried in the Third Circuit Court.

Increases in non-index crimes are more difficult than index crimes to calculate with the opening of casinos. It is assumed that forgery and counterfeiting, fraud, embezzlement, stolen property, prostitution and vice, family and children crimes, driving under the influence, and disorderly conduct would be the crimes most likely to experience increases with the opening of casinos and larger numbers of visitors to the areas around the casinos. It is also assumed that the same relationship exists for the number of non-index crimes committed in the 1st Precinct relative to the entire city as exists for index crimes — that 2.8 percent of these crimes will be in the 1st Precinct. Based on these assumption, it is estimated that 233 more arrests will occur if there is a 45 percent increase in these crimes in the 1st Precinct. If there is a 60 percent increase in arrests for these crimes, 310 additional persons arrested will enter the system. Non-index crimes fall on the court system as misdemeanor cases, which would all be heard in the 36th District Court.

Crimes associated with problem or pathological gamblers would fall on court systems all around the metropolitan Detroit area. While different court systems might realize an increase in some of the crimes associated with pathological gamblers, it is often difficult to pinpoint legal gambling in a local community as the lone source of the problem for these people. To some degree, courts in the metropolitan Detroit area might already be experiencing an increase in some of these crimes due to the Indian Gaming and Windsor casinos that are readily available.

It is impossible to calculate any changes in parking or traffic violations due to casinos at this point in time due to a lack of knowledge about how things are likely to change with casinos. Increases in parking and traffic violations would create a greater burden for the 36th District Court.

A persons chances of being the victim of a crime in the central business district should not be any different after the casinos open than they are today. Should the decisions about locating the casinos change to create a casino district, with the three casinos centrally located, it may be possible for the increased law enforcement to have a stronger role in deterrence. This would decrease the chances of being victimized from what the chances are today.