



STATEWIDE BALLOT PROPOSAL 22-1: TERM LIMIT REFORM AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE

In a Nutshell

Proposal 1 is a proposed amendment to the Michigan Constitution to modify the implementation of legislative term limits and require certain financial disclosures for state elective offices.

If Proposal 1 is Adopted, legislative term limits will be modified to allow legislators to be elected to the House of Representatives, Senate, or a combination of the chambers, for terms that combine for no more than 12 years and, upon enactment of an implementing act, each member of the legislature, the governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, and attorney general will be required to file annual financial disclosure reports.

If Proposal 1 is Rejected, legislators will continue to be limited to three terms (6 years) in the House of Representatives and two terms (8 years) in the Senate. Michigan will remain one of only two states without a financial disclosure law, but financial disclosure requirements could be enacted legislatively even without a constitutional mandate to do so.

Major Issues to Consider

Michigan has some of the strictest term limits among the states with legislative and executive branch term restrictions. They have had the effect of creating rotation in legislative and executive branch offices, but in doing so term limits have affected, among other things, important public leadership roles, relationship building, and the willingness of policymakers to tackle difficult political issues. Proposal 1 seeks to maintain term limits but modify them to allow legislative members to gain more tenure within a given chamber without extending their potential total time in the legislature.

Additionally, Michigan is one of two states without financial disclosure requirements for state elected officials. Ethics have been an issue in the Michigan legislature recently. This amendment would tackle one element of ethics reform by mandating legislative implementation of new financial disclosure requirements. This element of the legislatively proposed amendment is tantamount to the legislature asking the people to force it to address an issue it should have addressed on its own.

Introduction

On November 8, 2022, Michigan electors will be presented with a legislatively proposed amendment to the state Constitution. Proposal 1 would amend Sections 10 and 54 of Article IV (legislative branch) of the 1963 Michigan Constitution. The amendment would modify legislative term limits and mandate a

new law(s) creating financial disclosure requirements for the governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, attorney general, and each member of the legislature. The term limit provisions are self-executing. The legislature would have to enact a new state law to implement the financial disclosure requirements.

Term Limit Reform

Michigan adopted term limits for the legislature, governor and lieutenant governor, attorney general, and secretary of state with voter approval of Proposal B in November 1992. Looking at each legislative chamber individually, the limits adopted are among the shortest among all states: three two-year terms (six years combined) maximum in the lower chamber, the Michigan House of Representatives, and two four-year terms (eight years combined) in the upper chamber, the state Senate. Michigan has the shortest lower chamber limit in any term-limited state legislature. The maximum 14 combined years that an individual is allowed to serve in the state legislature falls roughly in the middle among states with legislative term limits.

Proposal 1 would change the nature of Michigan’s term limits from terms to years served. It would repeal term limits for each legislative chamber, and in their place fashion limits to overall time – up to 12 years – thus allowing legislators to decide to use their time in a single chamber or to split the eligibility between the two chambers.

The key question for voters to decide is how long they think legislators should be permitted to serve to be effective and how often rotation should be enforced to bring fresh ideas and perspectives into the legislature. Tangential to this question, voters should consider the amount of time legislators need to become effective leaders, such as a committee chair, speaker of the house, or senate majority leader (and their minority party counterparts).

Increasing or Reducing Opportunity for Legislative Service

Proposal 1 would change the dynamic of term limits. Term limits are currently enforced based on terms in office – three House terms and two Senate terms. The proposal would instead measure legislative

service in years and allow members to decide how to spend those years.

Proposal 1 will likely change legislators’ strategies for how they use their term limited opportunities. With opportunities limited in each chamber, politicians motivated to maximize their time in state government have had incentives to eventually seek office in both chambers. By allowing politicians to serve up to 12 years in a single chamber, the incentive may now become to remain in one chamber for as long as possible and with their seniority ascend to committee or chamber leadership. This has been the experience in California that made a change similar to what is proposed in Proposal 1, as described below.

In the era of term limits, Michigan has had 675 residents serve within the House of Representatives, and 160 within the Senate, totaling 737 people serving in the legislature. In the House, 407 (60 percent) have served the maximum three terms. The other 40 percent (24 percent two terms, 16 percent one term) served less than the maximum either because they chose not to seek reelection, could not win reelection, or abandoned the House to run for the Senate.^{a b}

In the Senate, 106 (66 percent) have served the maximum two terms. The other third served only one term.

Of the 160 senators, 98 (61 percent) were members of the House of Representatives before becoming senators. Many other representatives have attempted to extend their legislative service by running for the Senate without success. Of the 98 senators that have served in both chambers, only 42 (43 percent) have served the maximum allowable number of terms

^a The numbers reported for those serving less than the maximum in each chamber include current representatives and senators that may be seeking reelection in the November election.

^b Two were expelled for ethics violations.

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in both chambers.^c Six percent of the 737 people that have served as legislators in Michigan’s era of term limits have used the maximum five House and Senate terms for all 14 years they were eligible. Because Proposal 1 does not only apply to current or new legislators, 89 percent of past legislators would find themselves with some new eligibility to return to the legislature.

If the past is a reliable predictor of the future, this implies that Proposal 1 would represent a reduction in the opportunity to serve for about 6 percent of future legislators. For the other 94 percent of the legislators that have served less than the maximum number of

^c The usual pattern has been to exhaust eligibility in the House before running for the Senate. Rebekkah Warren served two terms in the House, two terms in the Senate, and then returned to the House for a term to exhaust all legislative eligibility.

terms, Proposal 1 would represent an increase in the opportunity to serve.

Based on this history, it is important to recognize that for many legislators the maximum allowable number of terms or years has been irrelevant. Forty percent of past representatives and 33 percent of past senators are out of the legislature with eligibility remaining.

National Context

Only 15 of the 50 states have term limits for the elected members of the legislative and executive branches. Some of the other 14 states with term limits have very stringent limits, while in others the limits are so generous that they probably do not have much effect on the average tenure of the state’s legislators.

Table 1
State Legislative Term Limit Provisions

Limit in Years	Consecutive	Lifetime Ban
8 Years Total		Nebraska (2006)*
12 Years Total	Arkansas (2020)***	Oklahoma (2004/2004) California (2012)**
14 Years (6 House/8 Senate)		Arkansas (1998/2000)*** California (1996/1998)** Michigan (1998/2002)
16 Years Total		Arkansas (2014)***
16 Years (8 House/8 Senate)	Arizona (2000/2000) Colorado (1998/1998) Florida (2000/2000) Maine (1996/1996) Ohio (2000/2000) South Dakota (2000/2000)	Missouri (2002/2002)
24 Years (12 House/12 Senate)	Louisiana (2007/2007)	Nevada (2008/2008)

Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate year of impact in the House first and the Senate second.

* Nebraska has a unicameral legislature.

** In 2012, California voters revised the state’s term limits so that legislators may serve 12 years in total in either chamber.

*** In 2014, Arkansas voters passed a ballot measure extending term limits to a 16-year lifetime total. In 2020, a new ballot measure altered Arkansas term limits to allow state legislators to 12 consecutive years with the opportunity to return after a four-year break. The 12-year limit applied to anyone elected in 2021 or after.

Source: National Conference of State Legislatures.

Three states initially adopted very similar term limit models – California in 1990 and Arkansas and Michigan in 1992. In the years since then, voters in both California and Arkansas have amended their state constitutions through ballot initiatives to alter their legislative term limits. Their new constitutional provisions move to a model similar to what is before Michigan voters as Proposal 1. Term limits in those states restrict total combined years of service in either chamber, rather than limiting years in each chamber separately.

California currently permits 12 years total of legislative service in either one or both chambers. Like Michigan, under California's old term limit model many legislators attempted to maximize their service in the legislature by jumping to the Senate after serving in the Assembly. It has been only a decade since California amended its term limits provisions, but within that short time there is evidence of legislators opting to remain in a single chamber for as long as voters will reelect them.

Arkansas has amended the term limit provisions twice since adoption. Starting in 2014, legislators were permitted 16 years of total service in either legislative chamber, or a combination of the two. Starting in 2021, the legislative term limits permit 12 consecutive years with the opportunity to sit out for four years and be eligible to run again.

The Goals of Term Limits

The state has achieved many of the goals espoused by term limit proponents when the proposal was put before the people 30 years ago. However, evaluating the state's experience must account for nuance relevant to the goals.

Restoration of Accountability. By enforcing short tenures in office, proponents of term limits hoped to reinforce the "citizen legislator" concept wherein those elected to office would soon return to citizen status to live under the laws enacted on their watch. As detailed below, term limits have accelerated the rotation of individuals through legislative seats.

However, the restoration of accountability has been mitigated by two extraneous phenomena. First, Michigan's experience with term limits have coincided with several decades in which the state has been one of the most gerrymandered states in the nation, meaning that following each census the legislature has drawn district lines to intentionally favor the party in control. By creating districts with large partisan voter majorities and thus firmly in control of a specific party, gerrymandering created a continuity of political philosophies within individual legislative districts, even as new legislators replaced

old ones. Michigan's independent redistricting process that was intended to create more competitive districts may do more to restore accountability than term limits have achieved.

Additionally, while some hoped that term limits would end the phenomenon of people making political office a career, it has only caused politicians to rotate

between elected offices. Where individuals might have sought office as a representative or senator and clung to that office for as long as the people would reelect them, under term limits service as a representative or senator has been seen as a stepping-stone from local offices and then onto candidacy for congressional seats or back to county commissions, city councils, and other elected offices.

Restoration of Electoral Competition. By enforcing short tenures in office, term limits have lessened the advantage of incumbency. However, the practice in gerrymandering of creating districts safe for each party (but presumably more of them for the favored party) has minimized the opportunities for actual competition in certain districts. With many house and senate seats safely Republican or Democrat, the party leadership have played heightened roles in recruiting candidates for office. Vacancies caused by term limits are foreseen and party favorites are lined up ahead of time to run in races with little interparty competition. Again, Michigan's independent redistricting process that is intended to create more competitive districts may do more to restore accountability on this issue than term limits have achieved.

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Reduction of Special-Interest Influence. Term limits have made the task of lobbying more difficult, but they have not reduced the role of lobbyists. The constant churn of legislators has created a constant need for lobbyists to build relationships and educate new classes of legislators on their issues.

However, term limits also created a void in policy experts among the legislative membership. A subset of legislative leaders before Michigan adopted term limits used their time and experience to become issue experts for the committees (taxation, health, roads, etc.) they were appointed to lead. Information gathering hearings were held. Oversight of the executive branch was exercised when departments were called to testify. Fellow legislators often looked to these legislators for guidance on bills and proposals.

Term limits reduced opportunities for legislators to gain sufficient knowledge to become issue experts and trusted resources for their peers. In their absence, lobbyists and other special interest groups have filled the void.

Increased Diversity. Diversity of the gender and racial composition of Michigan's legislative bodies has increased in the time term limits has been in effect. Term limits played a role in that evolution by causing more frequent rotation of legislators. However, this increased diversity may be explained by other factors. Society is becoming more diverse. Legislatures in other states without term limits became more diverse during this period as well. More women and people of various races are serving in the legislature, but more women and minorities are ascending to leadership roles in non-term limited local government elected offices, business, and civic organizations. Additionally, gerrymandering of legislative districts has packed minorities into districts, so the fact that minorities were elected to represent those districts seems natural.

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Long vs Short Term Limits

If the goals of term limits are being achieved, why do the proponents of Proposal 1 aim to change thee?

Several economic and cultural changes have coincided with the advent of term limits, thus complicating assessments of Michigan's experience. Since the first cohort of term-limited representatives had their service terminated in 1998, Michigan's economic status relative to the rest of the nation has diminished substantially. Michigan has gone from above average in per capita personal income to below average. The combination of Michigan's single state recession in the first decade of this century followed immediately by the impact of the Great Recession of 2007-09 made governing difficult at all levels.

It was in the term-limits era that Michigan has gone from a high tax state to a low tax state. Ill-timed tax cuts combined with Michigan's economic contraction forced cuts to services and left fewer resources to invest in infrastructure. As a consequence, Michigan has gone from a high quality of life state (17th highest in 1999) to a low quality of life state (41st in 2013), consistently ranking among the 10 worst states from 2007 to 2013.¹

Two areas of state spending illustrate how Michigan's economic fortunes and the functioning of the legislature relates to the state's declining quality of life. After term limits, local governments and higher education suffered greater declines in state funding than other service areas. Although previous Michigan legislatures have cut appropriations to these areas in periods of economic contraction, the extent and persistence of the cuts do not compare with the precipitous cuts after term limits. Prior to term limits, legislators made minor cuts to higher education funding during the recessions in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but from 1994 to 2001 state funding was fairly stable as a percentage of university operating costs.² From 2002 to 2012, cuts to higher education were steep, and this has made higher education

less accessible to state residents precisely when the economy favors more educated workers.

Following a similar pattern, revenue sharing payments to local governments rose from 1994 through 2001, but coinciding with the advent of term limits, the dollars available for sharing state sales tax revenue with local governments fell dramatically from 2001 to 2011.³ This contributed to local infrastructure problems and public safety cuts throughout the state. It threw several local governments into financial crises. In the decade from 2002 to 2012, Michigan was the only state in the nation that decreased its spending on municipal governments and the services they provide.⁴ The lost revenue reduced the payroll in local municipalities for police, fire, infrastructure maintenance, as well as other basic services. Local governments appear to be big losers under term limits, which is consistent with legislators' shift away from key local officials as a source of information on issues.

Compared to the 1990s, Michigan, after 1998, looks like a state in decline. But how much of Michigan's plummeting quality of life, municipal government distress, and contracting access to higher education can be attributed to term limits? Three factors may implicate legislative term limits. First, with a term-limited legislature there has been a desire to delay hard decisions until a legislator is out of office (kicking the can down the road). Second, there is an increase in partisan polarization. While this is true in Congress and in other states with and without term limits, it is heightened by term limits. Finally, Michigan's term-limited legislators are much more politically ambitious than were their predecessors.

Focus on Electioneering. The epidemic of partisan polarization sweeping the country has been witnessed to a high degree in Michigan. Clearly political polarization has become increasingly problematic nationally and in many non-term-limited states, contributing to gridlock and to persistent reelection-seeking behavior. But recent research using national roll call voting data demonstrates that term-limited states, including Michigan, have become

more polarized than have non-term-limited states.⁵ Michigan's practice of staying in session throughout the year and its experience with gerrymandering at the same time term limits have been in place both reflects this hyper-partisanship and feeds it.

To the extent that partisan polarization explains the difficulty elected officials have with governing and making tough choices, then the term-limited states are afflicted more severely than is the rest of the country.⁶ Term-limited legislators are much more politically ambitious than were their pre-term-limits counterparts. Contrary to the selling point that term limits would rid government of career politicians, term-limited legislators are more driven by electioneering concerns than their predecessors. Rather than focusing on electioneering activities that could help with reelection to their legislative seats, term-limited legislators' electioneering activities are often focused on moving up (from the House to the Senate or from the state legislature to Congress) or down (to county commissions, city councils, or other local government elected positions).

The implications of this are that term-limited legislators have chosen, consciously or subconsciously, to forego many activities that are less glamorous or politically appealing. Attending meetings with constituents and helping voters with problems (while important and admirable) take precedent over the information gathering that allows members to become experts on the subject areas for the committees they sit on. Oversight of executive branch activities takes a back seat to fundraising and building relationships with special interest groups. If the goal of term limits was to "drain the swamp," instead they seem to have made the crocodiles hungrier.

Proponents of Proposal 1 hope that allowing legislators to serve more terms in a single chamber will lessen the focus on electioneering and, therefore, focus more on policy issues. Opponents see the partisanship at the national level and in other non-term limits states and wonder if larger, systemic

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changes will be needed to lessen the polarization that is affecting policy making.

Unwillingness to Tackle Difficult Political Issues.

In a sense, legislating before term limits allowed legislators to bank political capital that could be cashed in when difficult votes were needed. Michigan's brand of term limits hampered the ability of legislators to amass political capital. Legislators' preference for electioneering saps their support for policies that lack immediate political appeal.

And with their heightened attention to electioneering and their limited ability to amass political capital, term limited legislators resist taking hard votes.

Today's term-limited legislators can be criticized for policy decisions that defer unfavorable changes until after their terms expire. One need only drive on state and local roads to experience the effects of decisions delayed. The inclination to tolerate deteriorating public infrastructure is clearly not unique to term-limited legislators such as Michigan's, but, according to the 21st Century Infrastructure Commission Report⁷, Michigan's road conditions are poor and have gotten worse in the past two decades. The Commission's report makes clear that Michigan is underfunding roads more than most other states. When legislators attempted to tackle this issue in 2015, the road funding package they crafted deferred several aspects of revenue generation until that cohort of legislators was term-limited from office. It is likely that term limits exacerbate the fairly common propensity to engage in governing by avoiding problems.

Part of Michigan's tendency to delay action arises from its boom-and-bust economy. Legislators await the next economic surge that will restore state coffers rather than taking action to improve the state's resources. The comparison of Michigan's post-term-limits status to its pre-term-limits status suggests that it previously coped more effectively with its cyclical boom-and-bust economy. Governor Snyder, whose accounting background motivated him to pursue some level of fiscal responsibility, battled throughout his two terms to convince the legislature to improve the fiscal health of the state,

only to encounter resistance and reluctance from his legislative co-partisans. Progress was grudging, however. Many back steps and missteps championed by both the executive and legislative branches further jeopardize Michigan's ability to fund essential services that would improve its attractiveness to residents and businesses.

Proponents of Proposal 1 suggest that if legislators are able to bank political capital to make difficult votes, perhaps they will be able to address some of the difficult issues confronting the state. However, the frequency of elections will not change, and party leadership will continue to work to keep the rank-and-file members in line. Concern for the political implications of unpopular votes is likely to continue affecting the issues addressed.

The combination of short terms and hyper partisanship seem to have shifted the focus of chamber leadership away from policy and increasingly onto fundraising for the political parties

Chamber Leadership. Term limits have created governance issues in the states that have adopted them. For Michigan, the issues have become particularly evident because the brevity of the terms do not allow talented newcomers to develop their abilities, especially their leadership abilities. The speaker of the house and other house leaders have typically been members elected to their third, and final, terms, having served previously just four years in the chamber. Senate majority leaders have previously served in the House before moving to the Upper Chamber, but other party leaders are serving their second, and final, terms, having served only four years in the chamber.

Additionally, the combination of short terms and hyper partisanship seem to have shifted the focus of chamber leadership away from policy and increasingly onto fundraising for the political parties and the rank-and-file members of each chamber for their reelection efforts.

Proponents of Proposal 1 think that allowing more time in either chamber will allow those ascending to leadership to better hone their skills, develop more policy expertise, and shift the focus away from campaign fundraising. Opponents remain to be convinced that more time will improve the abilities or shift the focus.

Financial Disclosure

Proposal 1 would mandate that the legislature enact by December 31, 2023, a law that requires each member of the legislature, the governor, the lieutenant governor, the secretary of state, and the attorney general to file annual financial disclosure reports with the Department of State. The enacted law will have to specify the repercussions of failing to file the reports. If the legislature fails to enroll a bill and/or the governor fails to sign the enrolled bill, a citizen(s) may initiate legal action in the state Supreme Court to enforce the requirement. It should be noted that the legislature is able to enact ethics laws, including financial disclosure requirements such as this, even without a constitutional amendment mandating it.

The mandated implementing law(s) requires financial disclosure reports that include information regarding all the following:

- a) Description of assets and sources of unearned income
- b) Sources of earned income
- c) Description of liabilities
- d) Positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, representative, employee, or consultant of any organization, corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, nonprofit organization, labor organization, or educational or other institution other than the state of Michigan. The positions required to be disclosed under this subdivision do not include positions held in any religious, social, fraternal, or political entity, or positions that are solely of an honorary nature
- e) Agreements or arrangements with respect to future employment, a leave of absence while serving as a legislator or state officer, continuation, or deferral of payments by a former or current employer other than the state of Michigan, or continuing participation in an employee welfare or benefit plan maintained by a former employer
- f) Gifts received and required to be reported by a lobbyist or lobbyist agent, as prescribed by state law

- g) Travel payments and reimbursements received and required to be reported by a lobbyist or lobbyist agent, as prescribed by state law
- h) Payments made by a lobbyist or lobbyist agent to a charity in lieu of honoraria.

Analysis

A representative democracy is predicated on trust in government and those elected to represent the people. To that end, state and local governments enact transparency laws so people can observe and monitor the acts of their representatives, such as open meetings and freedom of information acts, and ethics laws such as those that provide codes of conduct, rules of procedure, post elective office prohibitions (e.g., waiting periods before lobbying or working with vendors), nondisclosure standards, and financial disclosure requirements.

Ethics laws, such as financial disclosure requirements, are meant to enhance public confidence and participation in the election of and interaction with public officials. These laws may act to deter actions that would result in scandals, but the shared knowledge of the financial interests of these officials is equally significant. They permit the public to know when officials might be acting for their own gain.⁸

Sharing the details required in these reports would better equip members of the public to identify self-serving actions, but, perhaps more significantly, these ethics laws can have prophylactic effects. Financial disclosure forces government officials to share information that may be relevant in identifying votes that affect the financial wellbeing of themselves or their families from which they should be recused.

The challenge in crafting financial disclosure laws is to strike a balance of achieving transparency that makes the public aware of the public officials' financial interests without overly intruding on the individual privacy of the officials and thereby deterring quality candidates from seeking office. The flip side of this is that disclosure can be used to protect officials against unfounded charges of misconduct by political opponents.

In the absence of required financial reporting, the motives of individual public officials in acting upon proposed legislation or making public policy in other ways cannot be known without interrogation following their votes or other actions. Given the quantity of policies that come before these officials, especially the number of bills that are introduced and votes taken in legislative sessions, interrogation is infeasible. It is not always possible to know when officials are acting in accordance with their own personal beliefs, when they are acting to promote what they perceive as the interest of the people that elected them, or when other motives interfere. These financial transparency requirements would allow interested members of the public to at least connect the dots to infer when actions are taken for public officials' own self-interest.

Michigan and Idaho are the only two states without ethics laws for state legislators. Proposal 1 would remedy this, in part, by addressing financial disclosure

topics commonly found in ethics laws of the other states. How Michigan's ethics laws will compare to the other states cannot be determined until the legislature takes up the charge if the amendment is adopted and details are worked out in the legislative process.

Both of Michigan's legislative chambers have adopted financial disclosure as part of their chamber rules; however, these rules do not carry the force of law. Experience suggests that self-policing of such rules is usually not effective in combatting corruption. Because the formulation of public policy requires trust and compromise, the group dynamics within a state legislature typically create a culture of civility, assistance, and cohesion. Only for the most egregious actions are legislative members willing to call out the misconduct of other members. Ethics laws and the ability to enforce them have proven most effective when financial interests are provided external to the government offices – to the public.

Conclusion

Overall, term limits have increased turnover and correspondingly produced more open seat elections, but term limits also reduced the experience and knowledge of legislators, weakening the legislative branch relative to the executive branch and making it less effective. Furthermore, lack of experience, inability to work across the aisle, and a springboard legislature in which most people are looking for their next job rather than focusing on their current political responsibilities could easily sap the will to confront politically difficult issues.

Proposal 1 does not seek to eliminate term limits. It addresses the length of time a person may serve in the Michigan legislature and offers greater flexibility

in how time is spent between the two chambers. Noting that Michigan has among the strictest limits among the states with term limits, proponents of Proposal 1 are attempting to remedy what they see as some of the weaknesses of Michigan's legislative branch with these changes.

Proposal 1 also mandates the enactment of a financial disclosure law for elected members of the executive and legislative branches. Because the legislature has long had the opportunity to address this issue, but failed to do so, it appears that the proponents of Proposal 1 have "packaged" the financial disclosure requirement with term limit reform as a way to force action and influence voters.

Endnotes

¹ State Data Lab, <https://www.statedatalab.org/glossary/detail/ballotpedia-quality-of-life-index-20-year-rank-changes>, site visited 4/20/18.

² Michigan House Fiscal Agency, https://www.house.mi.gov/hfa/Archives/PDF/State_Appropriations_Tuition_and_Public_University_OperatingCosts.pdf, see chart on page 3, site visited April 20, 2018.

³ See *History of State Revenue Sharing*, Eric Luper's presentation to Urban Planning Studio at Eastern Michigan University, https://crcmich.org/PUBLI-CAT/2010s/2012/EMU_USRS_History_01-31-12.pdf.

⁴ Hackbarth, Chris, 2016. "Revenue Sharing Budgets Positioned for Initial Action; Senate Cuts Statutory by 1.5 percent", Michigan Municipal League, Inside 208, The League's Legislative Blog, April 22, 2016. <http://blogs.mml.org/wp/inside208/2016/04/22/revenue-sharing-budgets-positioned-for-initial-action-senate-cuts-statutory-by-1-5/> (based on the U.S. Census data, Survey of Governments for 2002 and 2012). Site last visited 11-25-2017.

⁵ Olson, Michael P., and Rogowski, Jon C. 2020. "Legislative Term Limits and Polarization." *The Journal of Politics*, The University of Chicago Press, Vol. 82, Issue 2, pp. 572-586. <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/epdf/10.1086/706764>.

⁶ Citizens Research Council of Michigan, 2018. "Evaluating the Effects of Term Limits on the Michigan Legislature." Report 401. <https://crcmich.org/publications/evaluating-the-effects-of-term-limits-on-the-michigan-legislature>.

⁷ Michigan 21st Century Infrastructure Commission Report, 2016, www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7-277-61409_78737---,00.html.

⁸ Staines, Alan E., 1976. "Model Act for Controlling Public Corruption Through Financial Disclosure and Standards of Conduct." *Notre Dame Law Review*. Vol. 51, Issue 4. <https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol51/iss4/4/>.

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